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Abstract
This paper gauges the attitudes of security experts in Australia with regards to public data 
availability on critical infrastructure protection (CIP). A qualitative survey was distributed to 
a individuals considered experts in CIP-related research in Australia, in order to address the 
censorship versus open access debate concerning public data. The intention of the study 
was to gain an insight into the perceived benefits and threats of public data availability 
by security experts, and to provide the basis for a security solution to be utilised by the 
Australian Government sector (at all levels). The findings however can also be applied 
to other data supplying agencies. This includes the identification and assessment of the 
technical and non-technical security mechanisms that can be enforced to protect sensitive 
public data elements that reveal information about Australia’s critical infrastructure. 
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1 Introduction
 Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) refers to safeguarding essential services 
from harm. CIP has gained recognition as a priority area on the national security 
agendas of many countries in recent years, most notably Australia, due to events that 
have compromised the critical infrastructure (CI) of other nations. The importance 
of the CIP process is evidenced extensively in the related literature, where the major 
phases of the process are discussed. Traditionally, the CIP focus is on the three major 
stages of vulnerability identification, risk assessment and risk management. A study 
conducted by Breeding (2003) introduced the risk of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ 
data to America’s infrastructure, viewing the threat on CIP from an alternative 
viewpoint. ‘Sensitive but unclassified’ data refers to information that may not on its 
own appear harmful but when amalgamated with additional data elements can be 
truly revealing about CI, thus posing a threat to CIP.
  The primary aim of this study was to raise awareness with respect to the 
censorship versus open information access debate, which is presently a prominent 
issue. Of great importance is to deliberate on whether certain CI-related information 
should be restricted from the public arena in the interest of national security, through 
a survey of security experts in Australia. 
 The primary objective of the survey is to gauge the attitudes of the experts 
with regards to the public data availability dilemma, a dilemma that is conflicted 
between whether public data should be restricted from public availability or be freely 
available. Public data related to critical infrastructure (CI) provide details about the 
characteristics of the CI, and in some instance can reveal sensitive information that 
can compromise the CIP process. 
 A qualitative survey was distributed to individuals considered experts in CIP-
related research within Australia. Due to the vast and unstructured nature of public 
data availability, it is evident that many components and aspects of the protecting 
public data must be considered and a multi-faceted security solution must be devised, 
based on non-technical and technical mechanisms. 
 The solution provided throughout this paper is based on the outcomes of the 
survey, which highlights the need to evaluate alternative security mechanisms, and 
determine a possible restriction process through the use of a stakeholder matrix. 
The solution offered is focused on providing practical tools and recommendations 
that can be applied by government agencies and other data supplying bodies in 
Australia to assist in protecting CI from the negative implications associated with 
public data availability.
2 Background to the study
 Critical infrastructure (CI) are the essential services that contribute to the 
stability and security of a country (Chakrabarty and Mendonca, 2004; Rinaldi et. al., 
2001). A comprehensive listing of critical infrastructure includes energy, banking/
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finance, water, transportation, agriculture, health and emergency, information and 
communications, storage and transportation, government, law and order, and cultural 
services (Breeding, 2003; Chakrabarty and Mendonca, 2004; Scholand et. al. 2005). 
A standard, global definition of critical infrastructure is not available; rather, each 
respective country determines their critical categories independently, based on the 
relative importance of each infrastructure item.
 Critical infrastructure protection refers to safeguarding the identified services 
from potential harm, including physical and/or electronic attacks (ASIO, 2006). 
Although minor variations exist regarding the specific phases of the CIP process, it 
is widely agreed that the typical steps encompass vulnerability assessment/scanning, 
risk assessment, and risk management (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Jones et. al., 2003). 
The CIP process is a crucial consideration today, particularly due to the prevalence 
of national security issues as a result of global events, including 9/11 and the Bali 
bombings.
 CIP has been a global concern since the Cold War. However, the issue has 
gained increased exposure in Australia since the incidents of Y2K, September 11, 
2001 and Bali, 2002 (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Emergency Management Australia, 
2003).
 Additionally, the importance and increased use of the Internet and Information 
and Communication Technologies (such as biometrics, database processing, geospatial 
information exploitation, video processing and visualisations) have amplified the 
risks on critical infrastructure (Popp et. al., 2004). These technologies provide outlets 
for data/information exchange, and have simplified the ability to transmit data. Of 
particular importance to this research is the exchange of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ 
public data; data that on its own may be considered unclassified, but when combined 
may reveal previously unobvious or revealing patterns, which may prove harmful 
(Thuraisingham, n.d.). Access to such information does serve positive purposes, but 
can also expose the weaknesses of particular CI, thereby potentially compromising 
national security efforts if the data is applied maliciously. 
 An introductory study into the consequences of public data availability on 
critical infrastructure states that there is an increase in the education levels of the 
individuals/groups attempting to penetrate critical services (Breeding, 2003). In 
particular, their use of technologies, and the availability of certain tools, has become 
progressively sophisticated, allowing room for the collection, use and duplication of 
information. These concepts are supported by authors such as Weinmann (2006), 
who asserts that the Internet offers a vast repository of data that may potentially be 
exploited, and be used to compromise the CIP process, and consequently undermine 
national security. 
 The amalgamation of the abovementioned factors has resulted in, or prompted 
the need for national security to become a major global concern. While there are 
current government and research initiatives in place focussed on CIP and national 
security, inadequate attention is paid the notion public data availability in Australia 
The Second Workshop on the Social Implications of National Security
Page 120 
as a fundamental consideration in the CIP process. Furthermore, it is evident that 
the benefits of providing and accessing CI-related information online are generally 
promoted, whereas the negative implications are often ignored. The focus of CIP 
efforts, to date, have been on the establishment of risk assessment and management 
strategies, thus reinforcing the need for perceiving CIP from an alternative, but 
equally significant viewpoint. 
 This paper will attempt to address the public data availability issue through a 
survey of individuals considered experts in the CIP field. The study will focus on 
whether the experts are aware of the apparent threat, and will document the opinions 
of the individuals, in addition to possible solutions to the identified dilemma.
3 Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) survey
 The Critical Infrastructure Protection Survey was distributed in hardcopy, at 
the National Security Technology Conference (21 September, 2006) and also 
subsequently online. The primary objective of this survey was to discuss issues relating 
to public data availability in Australia. Of great importance was to determine and 
gain an appreciation of the public data availability situation, as perceived by security 
experts. A key factor was to provide an outlet for security experts, researchers and 
interested parties who are knowledgeable about CIP to communicate their concerns 
and attitudes, and assist in providing suggestions to solve the public data availability 
dilemma. This dilemma is centred on the debate of whether public data concerning 
Australia’s critical infrastructure should be restricted from the public domain to 
ensure that high levels of security are maintained, and that critical infrastructure 
are not compromised.
 An additional objective of this research was to develop a solution using 
both technical and non-technical security measures. It is clear that the required 
solution must offer equal benefits to the four distinct community member groups 
or stakeholders within the Australian community, so as to ensure that a particular 
stakeholder is not disadvantaged in terms of public data access. The stakeholders 
include Australian Government agencies, operators of critical infrastructure, 
educational institutions and research networks, and the general public (citizens).
4 The profile of survey respondents
 The qualitative survey yielded twenty-one security expert responses, almost half 
of which came from individuals employed by the government sector. With respect 
to the response rate, the survey was primarily focused on qualitative responses 
to public data availability concerns and the establishment of a practical solution. 
Therefore, it must be emphasised that the number of responses received was not a 
limiting factor to the study. 
 The collective profile of survey respondents reveals a heavy reliance on the use 
of free public data, or a combination of both free and purchased data. An interesting 
observation is that not one individual (organisation) depended solely on purchased 
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public data; a majority of the respondents found that free public data is beneficial 
for their purposes and in many instances is sufficient for their use.
 In terms of day-to-day uses of critical infrastructure data, over half the 
respondents utilise public data to conduct risk assessment/risk management activities. 
Additional uses include government intelligence purposes, business intelligence 
purposes, service provisioning, Customer Relationship Management (CRM), 
navigation, construction, supporting response agencies with geospatial information, 
and research (tertiary education) purposes. 
 The overall profile of the respondents revealed that the group is knowledgeable 
concerning public data use, and that the data is beneficial for accomplishing daily 
tasks. Consequently, such information provided the foundations for determining 
the perceived benefits and concerns of public data availability in Australia, and 
working towards a solution to reach a balance between restricting data from the 
public domain and openly providing access.
5 The benefits and concerns of public data availability
 Security experts reinforce the need for a balance between data accessibility and 
restricting access to data. The survey responses generally indicate that the difficulty 
in this situation stems from the fact that public data availability can present both 
positive and negative consequences, depending on how the data is applied. 
 The respondents felt that the benefits accruing from public data availability 
include promoting community trust, allowing immediate responses in time-critical 
situations, and assisting in the completion of daily tasks in specific occupations. The 
use of public data for such applications is crucial; therefore, the security experts 
generally maintained that it would be unwise to restrict access to the relevant datasets 
in such situations.
 A number of security experts felt that community members have a basic right 
to access information concerning their surroundings and community. According 
to a respondent in the government sector, encouraging the concealment of basic 
community data and enacting harsh restrictions will inevitably result in Australia 
becoming a “secretive, scared society”, which is a disagreeable effect. An additional 
point raised was that CI-related data should be publicly accessible “to ensure that 
governments and infrastructure providers are not relying on security through 
obscurity.” Trust is an imperative factor in this situation, particularly in view of 
sustaining a positive relationship and level of transparency between the Australian 
Government and citizens.
 Certain applications, such as emergency management, rely on the transfer and 
exchange of CI-related data in a timely fashion. A common notion expressed in 
the survey is that in such applications, direct data access is essential. Public data can 
therefore aid with activities including continuity planning, evacuation, infrastructure 
protection, and emergency management for incidents, such as earthquakes, cyclones, 
tsunamis, bushfires, infrastructure disruptions, and terrorist attacks.
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 Additionally, the survey revealed that the majority of respondents rely on public 
data in their respective industries to accomplish daily tasks. Public data access is 
beneficial in these situations, and increases safety in particular occupations. For 
instance, a security expert in the construction industry maintained, “as a structural 
engineer, information such as ground levels, location of buildings, location of 
electricity, water, gas, etc is critical to the safe design of buildings and infrastructure.” 
Therefore, access to relevant CI-data, regardless of sensitivity, is required.
 Despite these positive aspects, the situation is complicated due to the potentially 
devastating implications of public data availability, which encourages that the issue 
of data restriction be considered in order to minimise the existing threats. The 
concerns relating to public data availability include impacting on national security 
efforts (and therefore CIP), facilitating other forms of misuse, and affecting the 
privacy and confidentiality of individuals. These concerns are further explained.
 The major concern identified regarding public data availability was the 
potentially damaging effects on national security and CIP programs, more specifically 
the use of public data for aiding in terrorist-related activities. As a survey respondent 
noted “access to data should be well-controlled to minimise the possibility of use by 
foreign and domestic adversaries”. This thought is shared by other experts, one of 
which claims “if potential terrorists can access good quality data over the Internet, 
this can eliminate the need for on-site reconnaissance, which in turn eliminates the 
opportunity for the behaviour to be noticed, investigated, and attacks disrupted.” 
Disregarding this concern can result in widespread and immeasurable physical and 
psychological consequences.
 The concerns associated with public data availability are not limited to terrorist-
related activities. Security experts expressed that CI-related public data can aid other 
forms of misuse and offences, with consequences such as increased crime, services 
disruption, vandalism, identity theft/fraud and obtrusive telemarketing.
 Privacy and confidentiality are also key concerns in this discussion. While the 
data of interest to the research is CI-related, a number of respondents felt that 
personal privacy is an additional concern, which introduces the ‘personal safety’ 
dimension to the study. This is an important area for future research.
 Therefore, public data availability presents positive and negative implications, 
although a government official responded that open access to data results in 
“CONCERNS ONLY”. Similarly, a respondent in the education industry claimed 
that there were “no major benefits”, as the positive aspects of public data availability 
are somewhat overshadowed by the potentially devastating damage. However, the 
majority of respondents feel that strict censorship and data restriction is not a viable 
option. 
 A common thread in the survey responses is that information should be available 
on a “need-to-know basis”, to the appropriate personnel who require the data for 
carrying out tasks that are advantageous in some way. That is, “the TRADE-OFF 
between what one needs to have to do their work well, and what needs to be 
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kept sensitive because it may be used against a nation” must be managed. This is 
based on the concept that data should not be made available to individuals with no 
“legitimate” purpose to access it. Legitimate, in this instance, refers to whether an 
individual can justify that the data accessed will be used positively.
6 Achieving the balance: the public data availability solution
 A notable outcome of the survey is that data should only be accessed for 
“legitimate” reasons. While in theory, this argument is seemingly valid and rational, 
in practice it is difficult to accomplish. For instance, a number of important questions 
emerge that require further thought: 
1) What CI-related data elements will be available to certain individuals? 
2) What conditions define a “legitimate” purpose? 
3) How will the process as a whole be enforced? 
The basis for a solution utilising non-technical and technical security mechanisms 
is put forward based on the survey results, providing practical answers to these 
questions.
 An important outcome is the introduction of a stakeholder matrix, which is a 
non-technical method that can assist in establishing the sensitivity of CI-public data 
elements. The stakeholder matrix provides a sensitivity-based grading system that 
determines the relative sensitivity of CI data elements, and recommends who should 
be granted access to that particular element. The underlying concept behind the 
stakeholder matrix is to clearly outline the three grades that can be assigned to a data 
element. The first grade is ‘unclassified/public’ defining that a data element can be 
accessed by any individual; the second grade is ‘restricted’ meaning that only certain 
stakeholders are granted access and the final grade is ‘classified/private’ indicating 
that a data element cannot be publicly accessed under any circumstance.
 The recommendation with respect to such a matrix is that it be used by data 
supplying agencies and bodies to decide which data elements may require censorship 
or restricted access. A sample matrix, based on the findings of the survey, is provided 
in Figure 1. The diagram depicts a possible classification system to be used as the 
foundation of the proposed public data availability solution. In its present form, the 
matrix can be used as a guideline; however, it is suggested that an expanded matrix 
be devised containing a comprehensive list of CI-related data elements and a similar 
analysis be performed by any agency that makes CI data available to the public. 
 The grade assigned to each specific data element in the matrix is based on 
whether security experts felt that the particular element should be available to the 
respective stakeholder. For example, if more than 66 percent of security experts 
felt a data element should be available, an ‘unclassified’ grade is assigned; if between 
33 to 66 percent of security experts believe a data element should be available, a 
‘restricted’ grade is assigned and if less than 33 percent of security experts believe 
it should be available, a ‘classified/private’ grade is assigned.
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Australian 
Government 
Bodies
Operators of 
CI
Education 
Institutions & 
Research 
Networks
General Public
Major Defence Sites 100 58 32 16
Telecom Exchanges 100 89 50 17
Sewage Outfalls 100 95 68 53
Banks (Financial Hubs) 89 74 47 32
Schools 100 79 84 79
Cultural Icons 84 53 74 74
Gas Pipelines 100 79 42 32
Shopping Malls 84 89 68 84
Dams 100 79 47 37
Hospitals 100 84 63 74
Places of Worship 83 67 67 89
Electricity Grids 94 83 58 17
Classified Restricted UnclassifiedKey:
Figure 1. Data Sensitivity Stakeholder Matrix
 The stakeholder matrix is a fundamental concept that will form the basis or 
foundation of any public data protection campaign, and is currently a missing 
element from the censorship versus open access debate. The survey reinforced the 
idea that this mechanism should be supported by additional security techniques, 
both non-technical and technical in nature.
 Non-technical security mechanisms refer to public data protection tools that 
do not require the use of technology to be accomplished. Survey respondents feel 
that non-technical security techniques can be beneficial in public data protection 
initiatives, the most appropriate being:
•	 Legal	and	licence	agreement	containing	conditions	of	use,	defining	the	owner	
of the data elements and “WHO” will enforce the agreement
•	 Legislations,	regulations	and	penalties,	such	as	fines	for	breach	of	legislation	or	
for inappropriate use
•	 Unambiguous	policies	and	guidelines,	accessible	by	the	public
•	 Developing	a	register	of	approved	users,	and	defining	how	they	may	use	data.	A	
suggestion was the use of “access control matrices”, auditing and classification
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•	 Communicating	frequently	with	users	about	their	rights	and	responsibilities	with	
respect to data use. Educating users is particularly important; “Educate staff in 
government agencies about how data can be used, and what tabs governments 
are keeping. E.g. internal audit systems that run on intrusion detection systems 
might keep logs of all transactions to do with spatial and statistical data”
•	 Limiting	 sharing	 between	 departments	 and	 agencies,	 particularly	 within	 the	
Government sector, as it is not possible to distribute data and be sure that the 
data will be used appropriately
•	 Introducing	physical	 security	on	assets	 to	ensure	correct	storage,	and	prevent	
illegitimate physical access of data
•	 Encouraging	 a	 coordinated	‘whole-of-Government’	 approach	 to	 data	
protection
•	 Prohibiting	companies	from	selling	data,	which	is	an	extreme	option	and	is	not	
realistic given the nature of the commercial data sector 
•	 Using	“common	sense”
 Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) facilitate access to 
public data through the Internet, and consequently are at the centre of the public 
data availability dilemma. However, there is the potential to supplement the above-
mentioned security techniques with technical measures in certain situations, and 
use ICT to assist in protecting and restricting access to sensitive datasets. According 
to the surveyed security experts, technical security mechanisms may include:
•	 Secure	 networks	 not	 displayed	 to	 the	 public	 on	 networks	 and	 the	 Internet,	
containing regular and real time encryption, logging, auditing, standard protection 
from damage (firewalls, intrusion detection systems) and appropriate filters
•	 Access	 control,	 and	 password	 protection,	 requiring	 identity	 checks	 to	 be	
performed for more sensitive data, such as defence information
•	 Security	clearance	for	access	to	sensitive	data,	including	providing	proof	of	identity	
and justification in terms of data use
•	 “Deliberately	non-integrated	systems”
•	 “Central	storage	and	distributed	access”
•	 Review	 and	 update	 of	 technical	 security	 techniques,	 and	 measuring	 their	
effectiveness
7 Conclusion
A key outcome of this survey is that the public data availability situation may be 
interpreted in many ways, and one solution alone (for example, a technical solution) 
cannot be employed. Rather, there is the need for a responsive solution that targets 
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specific stakeholders, and is concerned with the sensitivity of public data in terms 
of compromising the CIP process, and protecting individual CI elements. However, 
it is important to note that the response suggested requires further work, and that 
the approach itself is not infallible. 
 An important point raised by a respondent is that perhaps the public data 
availability dilemma is being approached from an incorrect angle, that we should 
not address the issue only in terms of the mechanisms that can be implemented. 
Rather, it may be “about facing the root problems of terrorism, and addressing them.” 
Extending this point beyond the terrorist threat, it may be valuable to address other 
adverse issues such as vandalism, fraud and competitive intelligence, and engage in 
why such activities take place and attempt to limit or address the causes. This requires 
further research, as it is beyond the scope of this paper.
 When considering critical infrastructure protection, it is worth noting that CIP 
is one aspect of a broader solution. As stated by a security expert, “a government 
cannot hope to achieve a comprehensive approach to critical infrastructure 
protection if they are giving away data about their own infrastructure.” Providing a 
wealth of CI-related data online can result in unscrupulous individuals conducting 
their own risk assessments, defining areas where the greatest losses will occur, and 
easily identifying the location of the CI elements. However, censorship is not the 
answer. 
 As demonstrated in this paper, a balance is crucial and many elements such as 
employing a structured approach using technical and non-technical mechanisms, in 
addition to determining the root cause of detrimental activities that can be carried 
out using public data, is essential.
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